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Abstract
Using a laboratory experiment, we examine if third party redistribution
from a “Have” to a “Have-not” is affected by (1) whether a Have’s
advantage is in some way self-determined and (2) whether selfdetermination occurs in two dimensions compared to one dimension. We
find that redistribution decreases if a Have earns an advantageous
opportunity or earns income. But we also find that redistribution does not
decrease any further if a Have earns both an opportunity and income.
These results suggest that, in line with existing work, the perception that
advantages are self-determined matters for redistribution. But the results
also suggest that, once one develops the perception that self-determination
exists, additional dimensions self-determination may not matter on the
margin. We also find that stakeholders’ expectations of redistribution do
not depend on whether advantages in the experiment are self-determined.
Expectations instead depend on whether a stakeholder is a Have or a
Have-not.
Keywords: redistribution, deservingness, experiments, luck
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Debates over income inequality, CEO compensation, welfare policies and other
issues involving political redistribution demonstrate that people care, often passionately,
about how resources get distributed in society. Much survey and experimental research
demonstrates that beliefs regarding the roles of effort and luck – whether advantages are
self- or exogenously-determined (Fong, 2001) – drive choices and preferences that
involve the distribution (or redistribution) of money. Less attention has been paid,
however, to addressing how perceptions of self-determination relate to actual selfdetermination. Given established connections between (1) beliefs about selfdetermination and preferences for political redistribution (Alesina and La Ferrera, 2005;
Boarini and Le Clainche, 2009; Corneo and Gruner, 2002; Fong, 2001; Gaeta, 2011) and
(2) beliefs about self-determination and actual redistributive policies (Alesina et al, 2001;
Blank, 2003; Larsen, 2008) these questions are not trivial; a deeper understanding of the
relation between perceptions of self-determination and actual self-determination
represents an important link in the causal chain that connects these perceptions to
preferences and, ultimately, redistributive policies. A better understanding of how people
assess self-determination will shed light on redistributive policies, as well as point to the
degree to which such assessments might be malleable.
Perceptions of self-determination have been shown to affect income distribution
in experimental tasks, contextualized hypothetical surveys, and large-scale surveys that
elicit citizens’ policy preferences. Across these various types of studies, a robust finding
emerges in both experiments and surveys: advantages that are attributed to effort are
rewarded, while advantages that are attributed to luck are not. These results provide
empirical support for liberal egalitarian theories of distributive justice, which claim that
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unequal outcomes should be permitted to the extent they stem from choices rather than
uncontrollable factors (Cappelen and Tungodden, 2006). Both theory and empirical
findings, therefore, point to moral intuitions that hold people responsible for outcomes
that stem from choices, and thereby permit asymmetries in economic advantages that are
perceived as being self-determined.
Given the empirical and theoretical connection between self-determination,
attitudes toward deservingness, and income distribution, we examine whether or not
perceptions of self-determination come from a fine-tuned, multi-dimensional assessment
of situational factors in a controlled laboratory task in which people make impartial
redistributive choices with real money. The experiment varies the degree to which
economic advantages are self-determined across four treatments. In one treatment, a
stakeholder earns the opportunity to acquire future income. In a second treatment, a
stakeholder earns the income itself. In a third treatment, a stakeholder earns both the
opportunity and the income. In a fourth treatment a stakeholder earns neither the
opportunity nor the income. Across all four treatments, an impartial third party is given
the option to redistribute any portion of the advantaged stakeholder’s income to another
stakeholder who did not have the opportunity to earn money. The treatment variables
(opportunity and income) are intended to represent two aspects of one’s life history that
may or may not be perceived as being self-determined. People have perceptions
regarding whether opportunities and income are self-determined (e.g. from self-made
personal development, one’s own hard work) or exogenously-determined (e.g. from
nepotism, having a privileged upbringing, acquiring wealth without working hard).

3

The design therefore tests if redistributive behavior in a simple three-player
dictator game is affected by (1) whether advantages are self-determined and (2) whether
self-determination occurs in two dimensions compared to one dimension. We find that,
consistent with previous studies, redistribution by a third-party decision maker decreases
with self-determination. But we also find that redistribution does not decrease any further
when the endowed stakeholder earns both his opportunity and his income. Additionally,
we find that stakeholders base their expectations of redistribution on whether they are the
Have or the Have-not, and not on the earning conditions in their particular treatment.
With the Haves expecting less redistribution than the Have-nots in all treatments, the
impartial decision makers redistribute in a way that is consistent with the expectations of
the Haves whenever there is something earned (the opportunity and/or the income);
whenever there is nothing earned, the impartial decision makers redistribute in a way that
is consistent with the expectations of the Have-not.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section embeds our work within the
socio economics literature on income redistribution and specifically describes research
that addresses connections between self-determination and income distribution.
Subsequent sections describe our experiment’s hypotheses, design, and results. A
discussion section offers interpretations and implications of the results.

I. Preferences for Redistribution and Empirical Work

As highlighted by Alesina and Giuliano (2010), the socio-economics literature identifies
three, non-mutually-exclusive sources of explanations for why people care about the
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distribution of income. First, income redistribution may affect someone’s actual or
expected income, either through preferences for immediate transfers given one’s current
economic standing (Alesina and Giuliano, 2010; Fong, 2001; Luttmer, 2001; Meltzer and
Richard, 1981) or expectations of future transfers given one’s expected future income
(Benabou and Ok, 2001; Piketty, 1995). Second, people may care about the distribution
of income because of externalities associated with the distribution that affect their
wellbeing; these may include societal education levels (Benabou, 1996; Galor and Zeira,
1993; Perotti, 1993), crime rates (Piven and Cloward, 1971) and/or incentives to work
(Moffitt, 1992; Piketty, 1995). Third, the distribution of income may, in itself, be a direct
component in people’s utility functions. Preferences over particular distributions of
income may stem from concerns for others (Gilens, 1999), beliefs about the causes of
inequality (Alesina and La Ferrera, 2005; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Boarini and Le
Clainche, 2009; Corneo and Gruner, 2002; Fong, 2001; Gaeta, 2011), and/or feelings of
group loyalty (Luttmer, 2001).
The experiment presented in this paper extends work that examines direct
preferences over the distribution of income. Specifically, the experiment’s design is
motivated by a great deal of empirical work (described below) that links beliefs about the
role of self-determination in the economy and attitudes toward the distribution of income.
This connection has been established in research that spans different methods, including
lab experiments, vignette-based contextual surveys and macro-level surveys. Since the
connection between beliefs about self-determination and income distribution is so robust,
we seek to provide a better understanding of how beliefs about the role of selfdetermination are formed.
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Laboratory experiments are well-suited to address how people react to differences
in the degree of self-determination because such differences can be easily and clearly
induced. While the initial waves of economics experiments assigned roles and income
randomly, researchers later became interested in whether outcomes changed when
advantages were earned through performance on tasks such as strategy games, quizzes, or
manual labor. Hoffman and Spitzer (1985), in a two-person bargaining experiment,
found that proposers who earned their advantageous position by winning a strategy game
allocated more money to themselves compared to proposers who did not earn their
position. Burrows and Loomes (1994) found that a bargainer is more likely to protect a
favorable endowment differential if the larger endowment was the result of effort.
Hoffman et al (1994) extended the result to ultimatum1 and dictator games2, while Cherry
et al (2002) and Oxoby and Spraggon (2008) showed that, in dictator games, decision
makers who earn their distributive stakes keep more of it compared to decision makers
whose stakes are arbitrarily assigned by experimenter. Ruffle (1998) found that recipients
(rather than decision makers) in dictator games who earned the distributive stakes
through superior performance on a quiz were rewarded relative to those whose stakes
were determined by an experimenter. Fong and Oberholzer-Gee (2011) used the dictator
game to show that people withhold cash transfers from poor people who are perceived as
not being deserving. In a series of papers by Cappelen, Tungodden and co-authors
(Cappelen et al, 2007; Cappelen et al, 2010; Cappelen et al, 2013) a production stage
preceded a redistribution stage in a dictator game, which allowed the redistributable
1

In ultimatum games (Guth et al, 1982), one person who has money makes an offer to a paired receiver
who does not have money. The receiver can either accept the offer or reject it. If the offer is rejected, both
players receive 0.
2
The dictator game (Forsythe et al, 1994) is identical to the ultimatum game except that the receiver in the
dictator game does not have the option to reject the offer.
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stakes to be decomposed into income generated by controllable and uncontrollable
factors; dictators in these games, therefore, know the extent to which each person’s
contribution to the redistributable pool was self-determined or exogenous. Cappelen et al
(2007), found pluralism in fairness ideals, with 38.1 percent of subjects being classified
as liberal egalitarians. Cappelen et al (2010) reached similar conclusions, but also found
that the likelihood of holding others responsible for exogenous factors increases with
work experience. Cappelen et al (2013) found that people are more likely to reduce
inequalities that stem from differences in luck compared to inequalities that stem from
differences in choices.
Other experiments have extended the above findings to three-person games in
which decision makers, without any of their own money at stake, must allocate a fixed
pie of income across two others. With monetary incentives removed, decisions reveal
normative standards of fairness. Dickinson and Tiefenthaler (2002) showed that third
parties reward stakeholders who earn an advantageous position, while third parties do not
reward stakeholders who acquire an advantageous position due to luck. Konow (2000)
showed that third parties reward stakeholders who contributed more to a distributive pool
by doing more work; third parties did not reward stakeholders who made greater
contributions to the pool because they were lucky to be randomly assigned a higher value
for a given unit of output.
Outside of the laboratory, contextualized surveys, describing hypothetical
vignettes, have examined distributive choices of impartial observers. Respondents must
allocate a surplus across fictional stakeholders who differ in needs, tastes, beliefs, effort
and/or ability. Faravelli (2007), Konow (1996, 2001, 2009), Schokkaert and Capeau
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(1991) and Schokkaert and Overlaet (1989) all found that third parties reward
stakeholders according to their effort, but not according to luck. Moreover, results reveal
substantial support for what Konow (1996, 2000, 2001) calls the accountability principle
– output (e.g. goods or money) is distributed in proportion to inputs that come from
effort, while differences in uncontrollable inputs (e.g. luck, innate ability) are ignored.
The accountability principle represents an extension of equity theory (Adams, 1965;
Homans, 1958), which predicts that people who contribute to a social surplus are
rewarded in proportion to their relative contribution.
A second type of survey research establishes a connection between perceptions of
self-determination and income distribution by eliciting both preferences for political
redistribution and beliefs about the roles of luck and effort in society. Using Gallup Poll
data, Fong (2001) found that preferences for redistributive policies are significantly
affected by whether one thinks that luck or effort plays a larger role in determining life
outcomes. Alesina and La Ferrera (2005) reached a similar conclusion for U.S. citizens
using GSS data. Corneo and Gruner (2002) extended the finding to international data,
while Boarini and Le Clainche (2009) showed the same result with French data and Gaeta
(2011) did likewise for Italian data. Kangas (2003) identified a “deservingness bonus” –
defined as the percentage difference between a society’s preferred benefits for the
undeserving poor and their preferred benefits for the deserving poor – in the Finnish
population. Fong et al (2004) explained this relationship between beliefs about
luck/effort and redistribution in terms of the human tendency for strong reciprocity, while
Benabou and Tirole (2006) used the relationship to justify their claim that people have a
tendency to believe in a just world.
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Across these different methods, an underlying theme emerges: when there is a
perception that one’s income is self-determined, either (1) he chooses to keep more of it,
(2) others choose that he keeps more of it, or (3) others declare preferences for policies
that allow him to keep more of it. Equity theory and the accountability principle make
clear predictions that effort will be proportionally rewarded when the proportions are
known (e.g. when decision makers or respondents know that one person worked X times
as hard as the other person). When proportions are not known – like in experiments in
which superior performers on a preliminary task acquire advantages, or on surveys that
ask for a general opinion regarding whether success and failure depends on hard work –
the effect is a shift in preferences that skews distribution toward someone who earns his
relative success or toward someone who is relatively unfortunate through no fault of his
own.
This earlier work leads to the general implication that a greater perceived role of
self-determination leads to a greater acceptance of income disparity. It leaves
unanswered, however, the question as to how people perceive self-determination given
the complex ways in which luck and effort interact. If Person C is told that that Person A
works harder than Person B, then Person C will likely tolerate Person A having a larger
income. But what if the Person C is also told that Person A was fortunate to have his
parents pay for his college education, while Person B could not afford college? How
does the introduction of a second dimension that is relevant to self-determination affect
the preferred income distribution?
Our design is intended to answer the core question that emerges from considering
this scenario: Are perceptions of self-determination fine-tuned along the dimensions of
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opportunity and income accumulation? If so, this would imply that policy preferences are
sensitive to messages regarding how self-determination contributes to the various inputs
to economic success. Or, alternatively, do people form perceptions of self-determination
without considering the multiple dimensions that contribute to it? If so, one should
expect policy preferences to be less sensitive to messages regarding the role of selfdetermination.

II. Design

Following the taxonomy described by Smith (1982), we vary environmental properties
associated with how roles are determined and how income is acquired within an
experimental institution defined by anonymity and impartial third-party decisions.
Specific treatment procedures are summarized in Table 1. Across all of the experiment’s
treatments, a decision maker was paired with a sender and a receiver.3 The sender
acquired money and the decision maker was given the opportunity to send any portion of
the sender’s money to the receiver. Differences between treatments stem from how
senders’ and receivers’ roles were assigned (earned or given roles) and how senders’
initial endowments were acquired (earned or given income).

[Insert Table 1 about here.]

3

Subjects were referred to as decision makers, senders and receivers throughout the experiment. While we
cannot rule out the possibility that the labels influenced behavior in some absolute sense, potential reactions
to the terminology cannot explain differences across treatments.
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Across our treatments, we followed procedures that have been used in several of
the experiments cited in the previous section to induce different conditions of earning.
Roles were assigned either randomly or by performance on a quiz. In earned-role
treatments, all non-decision makers took a current-events quiz.4 All subjects were told
that those who ranked in the top half of the distribution of scores would be senders and
those who ranked in the bottom half of the distribution would be receivers. In given-role
treatments, all roles were determined by the random selection of identification letters
prior to the experiment.
In earned-income treatments, senders were given seven minutes to work on a
challenging word-search task, earning $2 for each word that they found.5 In givenincome treatments, senders received the amount of money written on a randomly drawn
ticket. The distribution of amounts in treatments with tickets mimicked a distribution
from a treatment with earned income.
With both roles and income being associated with either a given or earned
process, the experiment includes the following four treatments, illustrated in Table 2:
givenR-givenI, givenR-earnedI, earnedR-givenI and earnedR-earnedI, where *R (*I)
denotes the type of process that determines roles (income).

[Insert Table 2 about here.]

4

Hoffman et al. (1994) used a current events quiz to assign roles; Ruffle (1998) used “general knowledge
and skill-testing questions” (p. 251) to assign levels of wealth, while Cherry et al. (2002) used questions
from the Graduate Management Admission Test (GMAT) and Oxoby and Spraggon (2008) used a
combination of GMAT and Graduate Record Examination (GRE) questions.
5
Senders’ earnings from the word search ranged from $4 to $36. Median earnings from the word search
were $17.
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Events and Procedures
Since we are interested in whether redistribution is influenced by the historical
process that led up to the Haves getting in their fortunate position, the design holds all
procedures constant across treatments except for the ways in which roles and income are
acquired. We recruited 336 subjects via an online database made up of undergraduate
and graduate students at George Mason University. We ran 24 sessions with fourteen
subjects each. All subjects signed a consent form, received a show-up fee6 and drew a
slip of paper from a container.
In given-role treatments, the main instructions immediately followed the drawing
of slips. The instructions explained the procedures and told subjects that those who drew
A-D would be senders, those who drew E-H would be decision makers, and those who
drew I, J, K or N would be receivers; the two people who drew Ms would be monitors.
After the instructions were read both silently and aloud, all senders and receivers were
brought by experimenters to different rooms. Decision makers remained in the lab.
In earned-role treatments, subjects drew eight slips labeled “Q,” four labeled “D,”
and two labeled “M.” A preliminary set of instructions then told all participants that the
eight people with “Qs” would take a quiz, and “the four Qs who score highest will earn
an opportunity to make money.” The four people who drew Ds (decision makers) and the
two people who drew Ms (monitors) were told to wait silently while the others took the
quiz. After the quiz, the main instructions were read both silently and aloud. The
experimenters sorted the eight subjects who took the quiz into senders and receivers

6

Show up fees were either of $7.00 or $7.50. Lab procedures changed in the midst of data collection. The
change in show-up fees reflects the required alignment of show-up fees with another laboratory on campus.
A regression analysis shows that no substantive differences in behavior can be attributed to the change in
the show-up fee.
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based on performance and brought the two groups to different rooms. Decision makers
remained in the lab.
Across all treatments, we used monitors to create double-blind procedures similar
to Hoffman et al. (1996). We coded all materials used throughout the experiment with an
identification letter, and monitors silently passed them out and collected them. In this
way the monitors knew the mapping from subject to ID, the experimenters knew the
mapping from ID to decisions, while nobody knew the mapping from subjects to
decisions. All subjects were also told that the monitors were responsible for ensuring that
experimenters followed the instructions.
The procedure for the senders was the following. In given-income treatments,
each sender drew a slip of paper with an amount of money written on it. The written
amount determined their endowment. In earned-income treatments, each sender worked
on the word search. In all treatments, senders received an envelope that contained the
money that they either earned or were given. The monitor then collected all of the
envelopes with the endowments and brought them to the decision makers. Senders took a
questionnaire that tested for comprehension of the instructions. The following question
elicited expectations7, conditional on the amount of money that they either earned or were
given:
You earned/have been given $X.
How much do you expect your paired Decision Maker to have you send to your
paired Receiver? $____

7

Since subjects were not rewarded for accurate expectations, we cannot rule out the possibility that
incentives for accuracy would have affected expectations.
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The procedure for the decision makers was the following. First, we gave decision
makers a questionnaire to test comprehension.8 Then we compensated them for their
time and decisions by letting them earn money with the same word search that
determined the senders’ stakes.9 We then gave them a decision form stating the amount
endowed to a sender. Decision makers decided how much of the endowment should be
redistributed to the unendowed stakeholder, and gave the envelope with the decision form
to a monitor who brought them all to the receivers’ room. At this point decision makers
were paid and dismissed.
The procedure for receivers was as follows. While receivers waited for the
decision makers’ decisions, they filled out questionnaires that tested their comprehension
of the instructions and elicited expectations (conditional on the senders’ stakes) with the
following question:
Your paired Sender earned/has been given $X.
How much do you expect your paired Decision Maker to have the Sender send to
you? $____

8

The first section of the questionnaire listed the number of questions that eight hypothetical subjects
answered correctly on the quiz. Respondents were required to denote which scores belong to senders and
which scores belong to receivers. The second section tested for understanding of the decision process. In a
table, amounts of words found (in treatments in which senders earn their money) or amounts written on
tickets (in treatments in which senders are given their money) were listed. Subjects were required to state
the amounts of money associated with each performance on the word search or each of the selected tickets.
The table also listed a series of decision makers’ hypothetical decisions. Subjects were required to specify
the earnings that each decision would generate for each sender and receiver. All decision makers were
given two questionnaires sequentially. After the first questionnaire, an experimenter corrected any
mistakes. A monitor then returned the original questionnaire and passed out a second one. If mistakes
were made on this second questionnaire, the subject’s decision was excluded from the analysis. All
references made to “correct” or “incorrect” questionnaires refer to this second-chance questionnaire.
9
Decision Makers needed to be compensated for their time, and we chose to pay them based on
performance on the word search. This choice models a situation where people making redistributive
decisions share an experience with the Haves. Additional treatments, which are described in a separate
working paper, show that decision makers who earned money (with the word search) did not behave
differently compared to decision makers who were given money (through randomization).
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After decision makers made their decisions, all decision forms and money were
brought to the receivers’ room, where an experimenter put the proper amount in each
subject’s envelope. Receivers and senders were then dismissed separately.
Decision forms provided the following information in given-income treatments:
Sender X was given $X.
The receiver with whom s/he is randomly paired was given $0.
I choose to have sender X send $____ to the receiver with whom s/he is randomly
paired.
In earned-income treatments, “Sender X has earned $X” replaced the first line from
above.

III. Hypotheses

Our design allows us to test how variation in the earning conditions affect the percentage
redistributed to the disadvantaged stakeholder.
When neither the senders’ roles nor incomes were earned, we expected the sender’s
preexisting entitlement to be perceived as being exogenously-determined, by luck, which
should result in redistribution of roughly half of the senders’ income. Letting αgivenR-givenI
denote the median percentage redistributed in the treatment with given roles and given
income, the hypothesis can be formally stated as follows:
•
•

Ha0: αgivenR-givenI = ½
Ha1: αgivenR-givenI ≠ ½

We predicted that when either incomes or roles are earned, there would be a lower
level of redistribution compared to when neither was earned, as previously demonstrated
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in the literature. Letting F(α**) denote the distribution of percentages redistributed in the
specified treatment, these hypotheses can be stated as follows:
•
•

Roles H0: F(αgivenR-givenI) = F(αearnedR-givenI)
Roles H1: F(αgivenR-givenI) > F(αearnedR-givenI)

•
•

Income H0: F(αgivenR-givenI) = F(αgivenR-earnedI)
Income H1: F(αgivenR-givenI) > F(αgivenR-earnedI)

The most important question that emerges from the design involves asking how
redistribution when both income and roles were earned compared to redistribution when
only one was earned. When both roles and income were earned, we expected lower levels
of redistribution than when only one was earned. This hypothesis can be stated as
follows:
•
•

Joint H0a: F(αgivenR-earnedI) = F(αearnedR-earnedI)
Joint H1a: F(αgivenR-earnedI) > F(αearnedR-earnedI)

And:
•
•

Joint H0b: F(αearnedR-givenI) = F(αearnedR-earnedI)
Joint H1b: F(αearnedR-givenI) > F(αearnedR-earnedI)

Rejection of these two hypotheses suggests that decision makers’ preference for
redistribution came from an assessment of how both roles and income were determined.
Failure to reject the two joint hypotheses, combined with rejection of the separate Roles
and Income hypotheses, suggests that decision makers’ preference for redistribution came
from a binary assessment of whether any factor was self-determined.
We can also specify hypotheses that compare (1) sender expectations with
receiver expectations and (2) impartial decisions with sender and/or receiver
expectations. Given the lack of previous research addressing expectations and impartial
16

decision making, we did not have preconceived predictions regarding whether the data
would support these various hypotheses.

IV. Results

24 decisions were collected in each of the four treatments, for a total of 96 decisions.
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics, both across entire treatments and conditional on the
amounts available for redistribution. The statistics sorted by senders’ stakes shows no
systematic relationship between the size of the redistributable pie and the amount of
redistribution.

[Insert Table 3 about here.]

Figure 1 displays the cumulative distribution functions of percentages sent, while Table 4
presents the results of pairwise Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. The three main results from the
experiment will be presented in turn. Additional results regarding expectations will
follow.

[Insert Figure 1 about here.]
[Insert Table 4 about here.]

Result 1: Redistribution was highest in the givenR-givenI treatment.
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A sign test confirms that the median percentage sent in this treatment is not
statistically different from ½ (p = 0.22). 18 out of the 24 third-party decision makers in
the givenR-givenI treatment redistributed half of the sender’s income.

Result 2: The existence of earned income or earned roles decreased redistribution.

The median percentage sent in the givenR-earnedI (earnedR-givenI) treatment is
0.354 (0.405). Visually, the effect of earned roles can be seen by comparing the
cumulative distribution functions of the givenR-givenI and earnedR-givenI treatments,
which are each marked with triangles in Figure 1. A rank-sum statistic of 2.90 (p = .004)
allows rejection of the hypothesis that earned roles had no effect. Likewise, the effect of
earned income can be seen by comparing the givenR-givenI and givenR-earnedI
distributions – both emboldened in Figure 1. A rank-sum statistic of 3.46 (p = .0005)
allows rejection of the hypothesis that earned income had no effect.

Result 3: Despite these two separate effects, redistribution did not decrease further when
both earning conditions were met.

The median percentage sent in the earnedR-earnedI treatment was 0.345. The
distribution of percentages sent in the earnedR-earnedI treatment is shown by the lightlyshaded line marked with squares in Figure 1. Rank-sum tests show that redistribution in
the earnedR-earnedI treatment is not significantly lower than redistribution in the
treatment with only earned income (z = 0.00, p = 1.00) or the treatment with only earned
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roles (z = 1.139, p = .255). Although the existence of earned roles and earned income
each separately decreased redistribution, the simultaneous existence of both did not lead
to any further decrease.
Regarding expectations, Table 5 presents descriptive statistics, sorted by
treatment and the source of expectations (senders or receivers).10 Figure 2 shows the
cumulative distribution functions for sender expectations, receiver expectations and
actual decisions within each treatment. Table 6 shows the results of rank-sum tests that
compare senders’ and receivers’ expectations.

[Insert Table 5 about here.]
[Insert Figure 2 about here.]
[Insert Table 6 about here.]

Result 4: Stakeholders with possession expected less redistribution than stakeholders
without possession; expectations did not depend on earning conditions.

Within all treatments, senders expected less redistribution than receivers; the difference is
significant in the three earning treatments and approaches significance in the no earning
treatment. Neither expectations of senders nor receivers varied significantly across
treatments: neither senders nor receivers anticipated the extent to which earning would
influence decision makers. Figure 2 and the last column in Table 5 show that actual
decisions met senders’ expectations in treatments in which there is at least one earned
10

Expectations from senders and receivers who answered the questionnaire incorrectly or submitted invalid
responses were dropped from the analysis. Results do not substantively change when expectations from
erroneous questionnaires are included.
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component (and decisions were significantly different from receivers’ expectations) and
that actual decisions met receivers’ expectations in the treatment in which there is no
earned component (and decisions were significantly different from senders’
expectations).

V. Discussion

While the logic of earlier work suggests that a greater number of self-determined
processes along the path to acquiring economic advantages should lead to greater
acceptance of income disparity, our results suggest otherwise. The decisions of impartial
third-party redistributors in the experiment are driven by whether or not advantages are
self-determined in some manner, but not by whether self-determination characterizes
multiple components throughout the process. In line with Kangas (2003), we find a
“deservingness bonus” granted to the Haves in our experiment: deserving Haves are
allowed to keep more than undeserving Haves. Our result extends this framework,
however, by pointing to the absence of what could be thought of as an “extradeservingness” bonus: Haves who earn their advantage in two ways are not allowed to
keep more than Haves who earn their advantage in only one way.
Previous work has shown that, when a redistributable pie is decomposed into
controllable parts and uncontrollable parts, people are more likely to permit inequality
that stems from the controllable parts (Cappelen et al, 2007; Cappelen et al, 2010;
Cappelen et al, 2013). Our experiment shifts the focus away from studying redistribution
when controllable and uncontrollable factors are decomposed into known quantities;
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instead, we study redistribution in cases where the redistributor has no insight into the
precise degrees to which luck and effort contribute to economic advantage. Such was the
case across other experiments in which performance on strategy games, quizzes or
cognitive exercises (tasks where success depends on some mixture of talent and effort)
generated either earned opportunities (Burrows and Loomes, 1994; Dickinson and
Tiefenthaler, 2004; Hoffman and Spitzer, 1985; Hoffman et al, 1994) or earned income
(Cherry et al, 2002; Konow, 2000; Oxoby and Spraggon 2008). These experiments, too,
show empirical support for liberal egalitarian principles of distributive justice, as the
presence of earned opportunity or earned income each leads to more unequal outcomes.
Our design tests whether the simultaneous existence of earned opportunity and earned
income exerts an additive effect on redistribution. Since our results show that it does not,
they point to a redistributive choice where greater degrees of self-determination (two
dimensions of earning instead of one) do not lead to a greater tolerance for inequality.
The behavior that we observe likely stems from a cognitive strategy that involves
reliance on a heuristic. Given that their choices are payoff-neutral, and given the complex
nature of the situation in which they are placed, Decision Makers in our experiment may
simply be looking to see if Senders did anything to deserve a greater share than the
Receivers – and then redistributing less (more) if the answer is yes (no).11 This type of
cognitive process would be consistent with theories of how voters form preferences for
political redistribution given social complexity. Someone making a generalized judgment
about whether people in society deserve their advantages will rely on ideology or other
cognitive heuristics to circumvent this complexity and reach a conclusion (Petersen et al,
2011).
11

We thank an anonymous referee for making this point.
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Thus, our Decision Makers and voters both seem to cope with a complex social
environment, where luck and effort interact in complicated ways, by searching for a sign
that self-determination exists rather than by carefully reflecting on the scope of selfdetermination. Our results make a novel contribution by providing evidence that reliance
on this heuristic is induced in a relatively simple environment, with only two stakeholders
and only two dimensions that are relevant to assessments of self-determination.
With inequality and political redistribution being popular topics within policy
debates, a better understanding of how people assess self-determination can shed light on
voter preferences, political rhetoric and the ultimate policies that emerge. The
experimental results presented here suggest that people form perceptions of relative
deservingness – which in turn shape redistributive preferences – through a binary
assessment of whether self-determination exists. We find a similar binary mode of
assessment in the expectations of the stakeholders, although it is based on one’s
possession – or lack of possession – rather than on conditions of self-determination:
Haves expected similar distributions of redistributive decisions regardless of how they
came to possess their stakes; likewise, Have-nots expected a similar distribution of
redistributive decisions, one with greater levels of redistribution compared to the
expectations of haves, regardless of the process that led to possession. The differences in
the binary assessments being made – partial stakeholders forming expectations based on
whether or not they have possession; impartial decision makers making choices based on
whether or not possession arises through self-determination – may be a source of tension
in political decisions.
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Economic success stems from opportunities and personal attributes that are the
products of complex interactions between luck and effort (e.g. education opportunities,
success in education, personal development, social skills, job acquisition, earning
capacity, etc.). Our experiment’s results suggest that a binary assessment of selfdetermination plays a simplifying role when impartial redistributors are provided with
stakeholder-specific information regarding the different predicaments of haves and havenots. The result points to an insensitivity to marginal changes in information regarding
the roles of luck and effort; this implies that more insight into precise mixtures of luck
and effort may not shift people’s impressions of self-determination.
The political popularity of targeted redistributive programs like earned-income
tax credits and welfare work requirements naturally stems from a cognitive process that
sorts potential beneficiaries into strict categories of deserving or non-deserving. Such
categorization also suggests that redistributive-policy arguments that advance beyond a
binary categorization of deserving and non-deserving (Blank, 2003; Bryan, 2005;
Howard, 2005; Van Parijs, 1995; Zelleke, 2005) should be expected to be less popular, as
they are unlikely to align with people’s intuitions about deservingness.
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Table 1: Treatment Procedures
Treatment

Number of
decisions

How senders’
stakes are
determined

How senders’
roles are
determined

Range of
senders’
stakes

How decision
makers’ earnings
are determined

givenRgivenI
givenRearnedI
earnedRgivenI

24

Random
amount
Word search

$4-$32

Word search

$6-$38

Word search

$2-$30

24

Random
amount

$4-$34

Word search

$8-$32

earnedRearnedI

24

Word search

Random
assignment
Random
assignment
Superior
performance
on a quiz
Superior
performance
on a quiz

Range of
decision
makers’
earnings
through wordsearch
$4-$36

$4-$34

Word search

$4-$26

24

Table 2: Design Matrix
Income
Earned

Given

Earned

earnedR-earnedI

earnedR-givenI

Given

earnedR-givenI

givenR-givenI

Roles

24

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics

givenR-givenI

earnedR-givenI

givenR-earnedI

earnedR-earnedI

Observations
(All or a subset
sorted by
Sender stakes
(M))
All
M < 10
10 < M < 20
M > 20
All
M < 10
10 < M < 20
M > 20
All
M < 10
10 < M < 20
M > 20
All
M < 10
10 < M < 20
M > 20

n

24
4
10
10
24
8
10
6
24
4
12
8
24
8
10
6

Mean Percent
Sent to Receiver

Standard
Deviation

Median Percent
Sent to Receiver

Frequency of
Even Splits

0.489
0.458
0.463
0.528
0.373
0.348
0.444
0.289
0.324
0.313
0.343
0.302
0.336
0.400
0.303
0.308

0.138
0.083
0.119
0.171
0.143
0.110
0.111
0.190
0.198
0.239
0.198
0.202
0.125
0.093
0.131
0.140

0.500
0.500
0.500
0.500
0.405
0.317
0.500
0.349
0.354
0.375
0.310
0.402
0.345
0.400
0.292
0.297

18
3
9
6
8
2
5
1
6
2
3
1
6
3
2
1
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Figure 1: Distributions of Percentages Redistributed

givenR-earnedI
givenR-givenI
earnedR-earnedI
earnedR-givenI

Cumulative Percentage of Subjects

100

80

60

40

20

0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95100

Percent Sent
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Table 4: Pairwise Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Tests

givenRgivenI

givenRearnedI

earnedRearnedI

earnedR-givenI

2.90
(0.004)

givenR-givenI

*

0.992
(0.321)
3.462
(0.0005)

givenR-earnedI

*

1.139
(0.255)
3.891
(0.0001)
0.000
(1.000)

W Statistic
(Probability significance level)

*
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Expectations

Mean

Median

Standard
Deviation

Pairwise Wilcoxon
w/Percentage
Redistributed

Sender Percentage Expected
(n = 22)

0.345

0.380

0.165

W = 2.967
(0.003)

Receiver Percentage Expected
(n = 19)

0.551

0.500

0.230

W = 1.351
(0.177)

Sender Percentage Expected
(n = 18)

0.329

0.356

0.213

W = .519
(0.604)

Receiver Percentage Expected
(n = 17)

0.527

0.500

0.206

W = 2.374
(0.018)

Sender Percentage Expected
(n = 23)

0.343

0.375

0.195

W = 0.486
(0.627)

Receiver Percentage Expected
(n = 18)

0.484

0.500

0.246

W = 2.294
(0.022)

0.360

0.375

0.154

W = 0.443
(0.657)

0.499

0.500

0.206

W = 3.008
(0.003)

givenR-givenI

earnedR-givenI

givenR-earnedI

earnedR-earnedI
Sender Percentage Expected
(n = 19)
Receiver Percentage Expected
(n = 20)
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Table 6: Pairwise Wilcoxon Comparisons of Senders’ and Receivers’ Expected
Percentages Sent in each Treatment

givenR-givenI
givenR-earnedI
earnedR-givenI
earnedR-earnedI

W Statistic
(Probability
significance level)
3.241
(0.001)
1.905
(0.057)
2.356
(0.019)
2.340
(0.019)

Figure 2: Distributions of Expectations and Percentages Sent
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Appendix A: Main Instructions
Welcome to today’s experiment. Now that we have started it is important that you do not
talk or look around at other peoples’ desks. Your decisions are private and we respect
that privacy. If at any time you have a clarifying question, raise your hand and someone
will come over to help you. However, we cannot give advice on what decisions you
should make. That’s up to you. You’re the one making the money.
Read the instructions carefully. At the end of the instructions you will be given a
questionnaire to test your understanding of them.
You have drawn an ID letter. For privacy, you will only be known by this ID letter
during the experiment.
GIVEN ROLES:
[In this experiment, there are three roles: Sender, Decision Maker and Receiver. Four of
you have been randomly selected to be Senders, four have been randomly selected to be
Decision Makers and four have been randomly selected to be Receivers. Each Decision
Maker will be randomly matched with a Sender and each Sender will be randomly
matched with a Receiver. Senders, Decision Makers and Receivers will not know with
whom they are paired. To preserve privacy, Senders, Decision Makers and Receivers
will be sitting in different rooms.
If you have drawn the letter A, B, C, or D, you will be a Sender.
If you have drawn the letter E, F, G, or H, you will be a Decision Maker.
If you have drawn the letter I, K, L, or N, you will be a Receiver.]
EARNED ROLES:
[Four of you have been randomly selected to be Decision Makers. If you drew a D
earlier, you will be a Decision Maker.
Two of you have been randomly selected to be Monitors. If you drew an M, you will be
a Monitor for today’s experiment. The Monitors’ role is to ensure that the instructions
are followed as stated.
Of the remaining eight individuals, four will be Senders and four will be Receivers. The
four who scored highest on the quiz have earned the right to be Senders; the four who
scored lowest will be Receivers.]
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Please keep your ticket as you will need to show it to get your payoff.
If you have drawn the letter M, you will be the Monitor for today’s experiment. The
monitor’s role is to insure the instructions are followed as stated.
Sender’s Task
GIVEN ENDOWMENTS:
[If you are a Sender, you will draw a ticket from a basket. Please make sure that you
write your ID letter on the appropriate line. Each ticket will have an amount, in dollars,
written on it. You will be given the amount of money that is written on your ticket. After
everyone makes their draws, someone will collect the tickets and bring your money back
to you in an envelope. The money will be given to you in $1 bills. Once you get the
envelope and examine its contents, you will then put all of the $1 bills in a basket.]
EARNED ENDOWMENTS:
[If you are a Sender, you will be given a word-search task. Please make sure that you
write your ID letter on the appropriate line. You will have 7 minutes to find as many
words as you can. You will earn $2 for every word that you find. At the end of the 7
minutes, someone will collect the word-search sheets and bring your money back to you
in an envelope. The money will be given to you in $1 bills. Once you get the envelope
and examine its contents, you will then put all of the $1 bills in a basket.]
Decision Maker’s Decision Task
If you are a Decision Maker, you will be asked to make only one decision: to choose how
many of the $1 bills, if any, you want the Sender to send to the Receiver with whom
she/he is randomly paired. You will make this decision by filling out a form that will be
given to you in an envelope. After you make your decision, you will put the form back in
the envelope. Once all decisions are made, the envelopes will be collected.
Decision Maker’s Payoff
If you are a Decision Maker, you will be given a word-search task prior to making your
decision. Please make sure that you write your ID letter on the appropriate line. You will
have 7 minutes to find as many words as you can. You will earn $2 for every word that
you find.
Your payoff = $2*(number of words you find)
At the end of the 7 minutes, someone will collect the word-search sheets. Your payoff
will be paid to you at the conclusion of the experiment; it will not be affected by the
decision that you make.
Receiver’s Payoff
If you are a Receiver, you will receive an envelope containing the amount of money that
the Decision Maker had the Sender send to you.
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Your payoff = amount sent
For example, if the Decision Maker has the Sender send $4, then you will receive an
envelope containing $4.
Your payoff = $4
Or if the Decision Maker has the Sender send $16, then you will receive an envelope
containing $16.
Your payoff = $16
Sender’s Payoff
GIVEN ENDOWMENTS:
[If you are a Sender, you will be given back the money that is left over after your paired
Receiver receives her/his payoff.
Your payoff = amount on the ticket – amount sent
For example, if your ticket says that you are to be given $20, and if the Decision Maker
has you send $4, you will have $16 left over. Your total payoff will equal the $16 left
over.
Your payoff = $16
Or, if your ticket says that you are to be given $20, and if the Decision Maker has you
send $16, you will have $4 left over. Your total payoff will equal the $4 left over.
Your payoff = $4]
EARNED ENDOWMENTS:
[If you are a Sender, you will be given back the money that is left over after your paired
Receiver receives her/his payoff.
Your payoff = $2*(number of words you find) – amount sent
For example, if you find 10 words and earn $2*10=$20, and if the Decision Maker has
you send $4, you will have $16 left over. Your total payoff will equal the $16 left over.
Your payoff = $16
Or, if you find 10 words and earn $2*10=$20, and if the Decision Maker has you send
$16, you will have $4 left over. Your total payoff will equal the $4 left over.
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Your payoff = $4]
Your payoff in this experiment will be completely private. The person who collects the
envelopes from the Decision Makers will not see the decisions written on the forms. The
envelopes will be given to another experimenter. Using the rules above, this
experimenter will put the payoff of each Sender and Receiver into envelopes and return
the envelopes to the monitor. The monitor will then ask you for your ID letter. When
you present your ticket with your ID letter, you will receive the envelope with your
payoff.
This process guarantees that all envelopes will be opened and all money will be handled
by someone who sees an ID letter, but not a name, so that nobody is able to match a
decision with the identity of either the Senders, Decision Makers or Receivers.
You should not talk to anyone about how much money you, or they, get. Note that these
procedures guarantee that no other person will be aware of your payoff.
If you have questions at any time during the experiment, please quietly raise your hand
and someone will come over to assist you. Please do not talk with any other participants
during the experiment.
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Appendix B: Preliminary instructions in treatments with earned roles
Welcome to today’s experiment. Now that we have started it is important that you do not
talk or look around at other people’s desks. Your decisions are private and we respect
that privacy. If at any time you have a clarifying question, raise your hand and someone
will come over to help you. However, we cannot give advice on what decisions you
should make. That’s up to you. You’re the one making the money.
You have just drawn a slip of paper. Your slip will either have a Q, a D or an M written
on it. There are 8 Q’s, 4 D’s and 2 M’s. For identification purposes, the letters have a
subscript number (Q1, Q2, D1, D2, etc.). To protect your privacy, you will only be known
by ID letters during the experiment.
If you received a Q, you will take a quiz made up of two types of questions. Some
questions will ask you about the 2008 U.S. presidential election, while others will ask
you about general international affairs. Your performance on the quiz will determine
your role in the experiment. Specifically, the four Q’s who score highest will earn an
opportunity to make money.
If you received a D, you will be a Decision Maker in the experiment. If you received an
M, you will be a Monitor in the experiment. The people who received D’s or M’s will
wait silently while others take the quiz. Everyone will receive additional instructions
after the quiz.
After these instructions have been read aloud, an experimenter will give the quiz to the 8
people who hold Q’s.
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Appendix C: Word-search Task
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Appendix D: Decision Makers’ Questionnaires
(Note: Senders and Receivers receive a questionnaire that uses different numbers and
includes only four hypothetical decisions. Senders’ and Receivers’ questionnaires also
elicit expectations of what the decision makers will do.)
This questionnaire will test your understanding of the instructions that you have read.
Feel free to refer back to the instructions as you complete it.
EARNED ROLES-GIVEN ENDOWMENTS:
[(1) Assume that eight individuals drew tickets with the following numbers written on
them:
3

8

5

7

6

4

2

9

Out of these numbers, please circle the four that belong to the Senders. Please underline
the four numbers that belong to the Receivers.
(2) In the following scenarios, some decisions of a Decision Maker (DM) are listed. As
indicated in the instructions, a Decision Maker is paired with a Sender and a Receiver.
You must specify the amount of money that the Receiver, Sender and Decision Maker
will receive from each Decision-Maker decision. You will do this by filling in the blank
columns labeled “Dollars given to Sender”, “Receiver’s payoff”, “Sender’s payoff” and
“DM’s payoff”.
Even though each Decision Maker will make only one decision in the experiment, the
questionnaire features multiple hypothetical decisions. This is done so that your
understanding can be tested in a more thorough manner. For each decision, please
specify the payoff of the Sender, Receiver and Decision Maker. Feel free to refer back to
the instructions.
Scenario #1
Dollar amount on
Sender’s ticket
8
10
20
14

Dollars given
to Sender

DM’s
decision
0
3
7
10

Receiver’s Sender’s
payoff
payoff

DM’s
performance
on wordsearch task
5 words
12 words
6 words
7 words

DM’s
payoff
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Scenario #2
Dollar amount on
Sender’s ticket

Dollars given
to Sender

6
24
16
12

DM’s
decision

Receiver’s Sender’s
payoff
payoff

5
2
7
12

DM’s
performance
on wordsearch task
5 words
12 words
6 words
7 words

DM’s
payoff

Please quietly raise your hand when this questionnaire is completed.]
GIVEN ROLES-EARNED ENDOWMENTS:
[This questionnaire will test your understanding of the instructions that you have read. In
the following scenarios, some decisions of a Decision Maker (DM) are listed. As
indicated in the instructions, a Decision Maker is paired with a Sender and a Receiver.
You must specify the amount of money that the Receiver, Sender and Decision Maker
will receive from each Decision-Maker decision. You will do this by filling in the blank
columns labeled “Dollars earned by Sender”, “Receiver’s payoff”, “Sender’s payoff” and
“DM’s payoff”.
Even though each Decision Maker will make only one decision in the experiment, the
questionnaire features multiple hypothetical decisions. This is done so that your
understanding can be tested in a more thorough manner. For each decision, please
specify the payoff of the Sender, Receiver and Decision Maker. Feel free to refer back to
the instructions.
Please remember that one will earn $2 for each word found in the word-search task.
Scenario #1
Sender’s
performance
on word-search task
4 words
5 words
10 words
7 words

Dollars earned
by Sender

DM’s
decision
0
3
7
10

Receiver’s Sender’s
payoff
payoff

DM’s
performance
on wordsearch task
5 words
12 words
6 words
7 words

DM’s
payoff
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Scenario #2
Sender’s
performance
on word-search task
3 words
12 words
8 words
6 words

Dollars earned
by Sender

DM’s
decision

Receiver’s Sender’s
payoff
payoff

5
2
7
12

DM’s
performance
on wordsearch task
7 words
4 words
10 words
2 words

DM’s
payoff

Please quietly raise your hand when this questionnaire is completed.]
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